This article explains the developmentalist status of political rule in the period of the Islamic Republic of Iran using the institutional theory of open and limited access "Douglas North". According to North, the elites and political rulers (ruling coalition) in a socie
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This article explains the developmentalist status of political rule in the period of the Islamic Republic of Iran using the institutional theory of open and limited access "Douglas North". According to North, the elites and political rulers (ruling coalition) in a society have two ways of forming social order and controlling violence. On the one hand, the open access system, which has impersonal rules and regulations, the rule of law and productive rent-seeking, which guarantees public access to society's resources and assets. And, on the other hand, the limited access system, which seeks to establish personal and private relationships and rules, sheikh and disciple (Murid &Morad) networks, unproductive rent-seeking and restricting the access of others to the resources and assets of society. Empirical evidence shows that open access systems guarantee and accelerate the achievement of economic development. Restricted access systems are not inherently developmental because economic development conflicts with the personal and group interests of the ruling coalition. Hence, political rule does not make a serious effort to address the problems and shortcomings in the path of economic development. In Iran, with the formation of the Islamic Revolution, the ground was opened for further opening of the social access system. But over time, with the occurrence of various internal and external events, political rule tended to limit the country's social system. This led to a special group of Islamists (traditional and fundamentalist right) becoming the dominant coalition of the country and using various strategies and policies to try to gain access to the sources of power and assets of the country in a centralized and exclusive way. Under these institutional conditions, the behavior of the country's political rulers is shaped in such a way that their main goal is to maintain the current political system in order to guarantee monopoly and centralized power and maximum access to the country's resources and assets. Therefore, increasing and allocating unproductive rents from oil revenues and government monopolies to groups affiliated with the ruling coalition, establishing personal and private relations and organizations, and restricting the participation and access of other groups to the economic and political resources of the country are the dominant coalition strategies. These strategies hinder the continuation and acceleration of economic development in the country. Thus, the behavior and plans of political rulers are not developmental.
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